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Background to the Report 
On 17 June 2005, the Federal Minister for Ageing, appointed a six-member 
committee to conduct independent reviews of Australia’s Prohibition of Human 
Cloning Act 2002 (Cth) (PHCA) and the Research Involving Human Embryos Act 
2002 (Cth) (RHEA)1.  The Committee faced the difficult task of reviewing such 
conceptually complex, and ethically fraught, questions as:  When does human life 
begin?,  What is the definition of a human embryo?, Should the creation of human 
embryos for research purposes be permitted?, Should an Australian stem cell bank 
be established?  Those who had hoped to see a liberalisation of the laws relating to 
embryo research (on the grounds of potential developments in regenerative 
medicine) can be somewhat encouraged by the Committees recommendations, but 
the uncertainty of the political process and some recent cases of monumental 
scientific fraud in the area may make it unlikely that the Committees quite measured 
suggestions are implemented any time soon. 
 
Since most of the science in relation to embryonic stem cells has developed as a 
consequence of the IVF revolution, laws related to IVF and embryonic stem cell 
research are intrinsically linked.  Australia’s laws relating to assisted reproductive 
technology (ART) and embryo research are less restrictive than those of some 
jurisdictions and more liberal than others.  It is common practice, for example, for 
couples undergoing IVF treatment in Australia to have a large number of the 
woman’s eggs fertilised and then to implant only those embryos with the greatest 
chance of developing into a viable pregnancy.  In Italy, however, only three embryos 
may be created during any IVF cycle and all three must be implanted in the woman 
who provided the eggs.2  In Australia, excess IVF embryos may be used for licensed 
research, whereas in Germany this is unlawful3.  In the UK, both surplus embryos 
and those created by therapeutic cloning may be used, subject to a licence, to 
produce embryonic stem cells. 4 In the US the Federal government makes no attempt 
to regulate research involving embryos, but prohibits the use of Federal funds to 
extract stem cells from human embryos. 
 
After considering 1035 written submissions and hearing personal presentations 
from 109 people across every State and Territory in Australia, the statutory review 
committee chaired by former Federal Court judge John Lockhart has recommended 
significant changes to the laws relating to research involving human embryos in 
Australia.  The Report makes 50 recommendations. 
 
Stem cells – embryonic and adult 
The Committee was strongly of the view that in order for Australia to “maintain its role 
as a leader in the advancement of high quality and ethically sound scientific research 
and medical practices”5, research into both adult and embryonic stem cells should 
continue without being subject to more stringent regulation, the prohibition on 
therapeutic cloning ought to be lifted and that a national stem cell bank ought to be 
formed.   
 
The implicit support for expanding the embryonic stem cell agenda in Australia is 
sure to be controversial, especially the paradigmatic shift to allow for the creation of 
human embryos solely for research purposes.  Although there has been some 
suggestion that researchers at Griffith University’s Institute for Cellular and Molecular 
Therapies, and elsewhere, are predicting that adult stem cells may be of as much 
benefit as embryonic cells for therapeutic purposes (thus questioning the need to use 
embryos), the Lockhart Committee found that “the extensive research in this area 
since 2001 has provided a complex and sometimes controversial picture of the 
plasticity of adult stem cells, and of whether any adult stem cell types can be truly 
regarded as pluripotent (capable of developing into virtually any other type of human 
cell).”6  Some reports suggest that these adult stem cells exist in only minute 
numbers and are therefore difficult to isolate and purify. The DNA in adult stem cells 
may also be more susceptible to mutation and genetic errors due to the number of 
times they have replicated during the person’s life. Opponents of embryonic stem cell 
research point out that this research has, as yet, not produced any clinically 
significant treatments, whereas adult stem cell therapy has been used to treat some 
heart conditions in clinical trials.   
 
The Report noted that two Australian produced stem cell lines have already been 
deposited with the UK Stem Cell Bank and been made available to international 
researchers without the burden of commercial or intellectual property restrictions.  
The UK bank was established in 2002 and is overseen by a Steering Committee 
which is administered by a Management Committee  comprising of members from 
research, academia, health care bodies, regulatory bodies and a lay member.  The 
Lockhart Committee does not suggest how an Australian stem cell bank would be 
managed or regulated other than to suggest that this be done by the Australian Stem 
Cell Centre.  Although there were vigorous submissions opposed to any sort of 
destructive embryonic testing and experimentation, the Committee felt that its brief to 
consider changes in community values and developments in technology justified its 
major recommendations. 
 
Defining “human embryo” 
The Committee noted that with three decades of ART research and practice behind 
us the time has long passed when we can be satisfied with a legal definition of a 
human embryo which simply involves the fertilisation of a human egg by a human 
sperm.  A fundamental judgement needs to be made about when a fertilised egg 
becomes a potential life form deserving of special ethical respect and treatment.  A 
key recommendation of the Committee was for a clearer definition of what a human 
embryo is.  The current statutory definition catches embryos from about the age of 22 
hours to about 8 weeks.7  This is in stark contrast to the definition which many in the 
scientific community would prefer.  
 
The UK’s Warnock Committee were of the view that until the fourteenth day of 
development most cells of the embryo had the potential to develop into tissue which 
would not even form part of the ultimate foetus (such as placenta or the amniotic 
sac), and that cells which were identifiable as dedicated to the development of the 
foetus itself would not be determined until at least day 14 after conception.8  Defining 
an embryo before this stage as a “potential life” therefore, according to the Warnock 
Committee” was inaccurate and misleading.   Although this view would seem to have 
some scientific basis and rational appeal, the Lockhart Committee’s proposed 
definition is not so courageous.9 
 
The Committee suggests (Recommendation 28) adapting the NHMRC preference for 
two definitions of “human embryo”: 
 
(i) the first mitotic cell division when fertilisation of a human oocyte (egg) by a human 
sperm is complete; or 
 
(ii) any other process that initiates organised development of a biological entity with a 
human nuclear genome or altered human nuclear genome that has the potential to 
develop up to, or beyond, 14 days and has not yet reached eight weeks of 
development. (This second definition would then make it clear that an entity that is 
produced by cloning, without any fertilisation by a sperm, qualifies as an embryo). 
 
Therapeutic cloning 
A much more contentious issue is sure to be the Committee’s decision to 
recommend that therapeutic cloning ought to be made lawful in certain 
circumstances.  Cloning involves the removal of the nucleus from a human egg cell 
and its replacement with genetic material from another person.  The embryo thus 
created generally contains an almost exact genetic match of the person donating the 
somatic cell, rather than a genetic blend of two natural parents.  Predictably, the 
Committee recommended that the current ban on reproductive cloning under the 
PHCA remain, that is, that it continue to be an offence to implant any such embryo 
clone in a woman (Recommendation 2).  The Committee does, however, recommend 
that it be lawful to disaggregate the inner cell mass from an embryo clone and then 
culture this mass to produce embryonic stem cells for research purposes.  This is a 
significant move beyond the sort of embryonic stem cell research which is currently 
permitted in Australia and is really the salient feature of the Lockhart Report. 
 
Significantly, the Report is somewhat equivocal as to whether full therapeutic cloning 
which involves the creation of genetic material from more than two people ought to 
be permitted – something which is currently expressly prohibited pursuant to PHCA.  
On the one hand the Committee recommends that it remain an offence to implant a 
woman with an embryo which contains the DNA of more than two people 
(Recommendation 8) but then rather weakly suggests that “consideration should be 
given” to the use of cytoplasmic transfer (including transfer of mitochondrial DNA), 
under licence, for research on mitochondrial disease and other uses to improve ART 
treatment.10  Recommendation 26, however, expressly allows for the creation of 
human embryos containing the genetic material of more than two people.  The UK 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority this year broke new ground when it 
issued a licence to a research team at the University of Newcastle-upon-Tyne to use 
therapeutic cloning to conduct research into a mitochondrial disorder, muscular 
dystrophy.11  In order to undertake this research the team were authorised to create a 
human embryo via SCNT containing the genetic material of three people.  The 
research, funded by the Muscular Dystrophy Campaign, involves the transfer of the 
pro-nuclei from the embryo of a couple, into an unfertilised egg of the intended 
mother, which has had its own pro-nuclei removed.   
 
The egg of the intended mother is unsuitable for reproductive purposes as the 
cytoplasm within the egg, which hosts the mitochondrial DNA of the mother, contains 
the gene for muscular dystrophy.  This process is intended to remove the genetic 
defect from the mother’s egg.  Researchers in the US have already established that 
this process works for mice and the Newcastle team are hoping that the process can 
be replicated with human embryos.  Families with a history of mitochondrial disorders 
may take heart at these recommendations, although the technology is in its infancy, 
and as noted above the Report does not go so far as to recommend that embryos 
created in this way be implanted. 
 
Therapeutic cloning via SCNT, however, receives the unequivocal support of the 
Committee, although a strict licencing and monitoring regime is advised.  
Recommendation 23 calls for the licensed creation of human embryo clones for 
research, training and clinical applications – including the production of embryonic 
stem cells.  In order to reduce the need for the donation of human oocytes (eggs), 
Recommendation 24 would allow the transfer of human somatic cell nuclei into 
animal oocytes.  A closer reading of the Report suggests that this particular 
recommendation is based squarely on the perceived need to kick-start the production 
of embryonic stem cell lines in Australia, and the mixing of human and animal tissue 
in this way is sure to stimulate significant debate in parliament if the recommendation 
ever makes its way into a draft Bill. 
 
Will the recommendations be enacted? 
Perhaps to foreshadow the inevitably close nature of any conscience vote on these 
issues in the Federal parliament next year, it is worth noting that in submissions from 
the States and Territories regarding therapeutic cloning, Queensland, New South 
Wales and Victoria supported the removal of the prohibition, but Western Australia 
did not seek the removal on the grounds that in a parliamentary debate there in 2004, 
there was no evidence of political or community support for the use of SCNT. 
 
Given that many, if not most, institutions currently undertaking research involving 
human embryos are also commercial ART service providers, Recommendation 37 
that “There should be no attempt to recover the cost of administration, licensing, 
monitoring and inspection activities associated with the legislation from researchers” 
seems appropriate. 
 
The advocates for loosening the existing regulatory scheme will not have been 
buoyed by the recent exposure of extensive scientific fraud in other leading 
jurisdictions.  In its influential submission to the Lockhart Review Committee, the 
peak research body, the Australian Stem Cell Centre, urged the committee to adopt a 
progressive view on embryonic stem cell research and noted that “recent advances 
in knowledge have exceeded expectations.”12   
 
The Centre then cites a number of ground breaking advances made by Professor 
Woo Suk Hwang from Korea, most notably his alleged proof, published in the iconic 
journal Science, that somatic cell nuclear transfer in humans was possible.  This 
process, if perfected, would be crucial to medical research as it allows the creation, 
by cloning, of a human embryo which can be guaranteed to carry the genetic disease 
from which the person donating the somatic cell (usually a skin cell) suffers.   
 
In late 2005, a panel set up to investigate Hwang’s work found that his team had 
intentionally fabricated data in this, and other, research.  Science withdrew the 
article13 and Hwang, who was until then seen as the world’s leading authority in the 
area, resigned his position at Seoul University and the World Stem Cell Hub. 
 
Despite the quite measured and considered recommendations made by the 
Committee, we ought not to assume that they will be adopted in total, or even in part, 
by legislators.  A number of commentators have observed that the differences in 
public policy between a number of developed nations has ‘led to a strange 
jurisdictional conflict where culturally similar countries have strikingly different 
regulatory approaches to therapeutic cloning’.  They conclude that although these 
countries with diverse regulatory approaches (such as the United Kingdom, United 
States, Canada and Australia) seem to have considered the same issues of public, 
policy, moral ambiguity and pragmatics (in terms of the need to keep pace with 
biotechnology innovations at a global level), the differences in approach seem hard 
to justify.14 
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